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In recent years, social movements and popular media have drawn attention
to the issue of income inequality in the United States. This growing inequality in the distribution of income is often seen as a function of stagnating wage
growth in the U.S. economy. There appears to be a fairly broad consensus
among commentators that wage growth for many workers in the U.S. has stagnated in recent decades, though the precise causes and implications of this
trend are a matter of considerable dispute. Some see it as a function of stagnant
productivity growth, while others attribute it to the declining strength of the
labor movement. This paper uses multiple regression analyses in an attempt
to provide an empirical means to judge the theoretical salience of these contending viewpoints. The results of this study indicate that while wage growth
has in fact maintained a positive correlation with productivity, this correlation is much weaker than expected, particularly for manufacturing industries.
Furthermore, while labor union strength appears to be an insignificant factor
in the determination of wages for manufacturing industries, it retains a strong
statistical significance in service sector wages. I argue that this finding reflects
a historical shift in the composition of U.S. industry. The data gathered in this
study supports the view that labor union density plays a role in the strength of
wage-productivity elasticity, which raises important questions of how best to
conceptualize wage growth and aggregate income distribution from the standpoint of economic theory.

Introduction
How do empirical trends in the U.S. economy give credence to contending conceptualizations of wage determination? That is, does empirical evidence suggest that wages are
primarily a function of productivity (as neoclassical theory would suggest) or social forces
(as some working in heterodox theoretical traditions would contend)? How might wage
determination differ between sectors of the economy?
http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit
11

12

SHEFFIELD

[Vol. 4:2

To answer these questions, I conducted a regression analysis of real wage growth in
the U.S. economy since the mid-1960s. Separate regression models were constructed for the
manufacturing (goods-producing) and service sectors. The results indicate that wages have
maintained a positive correlation with productivity in both sectors, though this correlation
is relatively weak for manufacturing industries. In addition, one measure of labor union
strength is shown to be statistically insignificant for manufacturing industries while it retains
a strong statistical significance for service industries. It would appear, then, that labor union
strength could play a role in how wage growth responds to productivity increases.
Section 2 will briefly outline the objective of our analysis and its theoretical basis,
while Section 3 will cover the choice of variables and the intuition behind their inclusion.
Section 4 will explore the models to be estimated and will discuss issues pertaining to the
choice of estimator. Section 5 will contain discussion of the results, along with suggestions
for further research.

Theoretical Framework
In recent years, long-term trends in wage growth and income inequality in the United
States have become important topics of debate in both the media and in academia. Contrary
to hitherto prevailing assumptions about living standards, some evidence seems to vindicate the claims of those who argue that the standard of living for many U.S. citizens has
faltered over the last several decades (Carter 2007; Mishel 2012). However, there is very
little consensus over why wage growth has stagnated or how changes in wage growth over
time should be conceptualized.
According to the neoclassical theory of distribution, real wages are equal to the marginal productivity of labor, which is a measure of the marginal contribution to a firm’s
output of hiring an additional worker, holding capital constant. The marginal productivity
of labor (MPL), in turn, is assumed to be proportional to average labor productivity if the
associated production function is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas form (Mankiw 2010).
Despite long-standing claims that this characterization is misleading (Shaikh 1974), some
empirical evidence shows a strong positive correlation between the growth rate of labor productivity and the growth rate of real wages in the post-war U.S. economy (Mankiw 2010).
However, the mere existence of this empirical correlation does not effectively validate the theory, for it does not tell us anything about who is receiving compensation increases and whether or not those recipients are responsible for the corresponding productivity increases. Moseley argues that disaggregating the data to distinguish between
supervisory and non-supervisory workers would show “no close link between productivity
and the real wage in recent decades” (2012, 123). Unfortunately, this claim cannot be corroborated, as the author does not provide a complete analysis.
Alternatively, there are those who contend that wages are a “socially determined
variable” (Shaikh 2003, 131). As such, wages are perceived to be primarily a function
of the strength of employees to force their employers to increase labor’s share of income
(Shaikh 2003; Carter 2007; Rowthorn 1980). Proponents of this view, which is characteristic of some heterodox theoretical traditions, would argue that employers have little incentive to voluntarily increase the wages of their employees and, as such, employees must
actively strive to put pressure on their employers in order to increase or even maintain their
standard of living due to inflation.
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Although these two views are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they paint a very
different picture of how wage trends change over time. An empirical analysis of trends in
real wages over the last several decades would presumably allow us to substantiate some
of these theoretical claims and conjecture their relative importance in aggregate wage determination. In light of Moseley’s criticism, however, this analysis should control for possible discrepancies in wage/productivity correlation by disaggregating the data into those
in charge (supervisory workers) and those not in charge (production and non-supervisory workers). Unfortunately, data on supervisory compensation are not readily available.
However, data on production/non-supervisory workers are available; therefore, this study
focused only on production/non-supervisory workers. With that said, it would be interesting to replicate this study for supervisory workers in order to see how trends in their compensation differ over time from that of non-supervisory workers.
In order to control for changes in the industrial composition of the U.S. economy
over the decades in question, separate models for goods-producing and service-providing
industries were estimated. This allowed for an evaluation of how these industries interact
and how they are differentially impacted by macroeconomic dynamics. It should be noted that in this study, all personal characteristics of individual workers (i.e. race/ethnicity,
gender, education level, etc.) were abstracted, not because these factors are irrelevant but
because this study focused on an examination of wage trends in the context of aggregate
income distribution, and in this regard such characteristics as gender and educational level
are beyond the scope of this paper.

Variable Selection
The variables chosen are intended to capture the effects on wage determination from several different sources. The choice of wage measure, in particular, deserves some justification.
The data on employee earnings have been deflated by the CPI-W (Consumer Price
Index for urban wage earners and clerical workers), which adjusts for changes in the prices
of consumer goods. There are two caveats to this choice: First, it is argued that in order to
remain consistent with marginal productivity theory measures of employee compensation
must be deflated by the implicit price deflator for the sector in question rather than the standard consumer price index, which is how the BLS calculates real earnings (Sullivan 1997).
This would deflate earnings in a manner that accounts for changes in the cost of producer
goods (i.e., the goods that producers purchase as inputs into the production process). From
the consumer’s perspective, however, purchasing power is a function of how many consumer goods can be bought with those earnings.
Therefore, it makes more sense to use a consumer price index if one is concerned
with wages as purchasing power rather than as costs. This is more consistent with the question of how real wages (i.e. purchasing power) have changed over time. Another caveat to
the choice of earnings data is that, due to limitations in data availability, they do not reflect
changes in employee benefits (e.g. insurance, retirement, etc.). However, accounting for
these benefits has a relatively slight impact on the absolute magnitudes of employee compensation and does little to affect the long term trend in wage changes (see Mishel 2012,
charts 1 and 2). Furthermore, the change in benefits as a proportion of total compensation
over the last several decades has been negligible (Mishel 2012) and therefore will not
jeopardize our results.
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Measures of output per hour worked will allow us to account for changes in productivity, which theory would suggest exhibits a strong positive correlation with wage
growth.2 Presumably, as workers become more productive their employers are going to be
willing to pay them more for their labor power. It is a little more difficult, however, to quantify the pressure that employees put on employers for better pay. Since labor union strength
has historically played a strong role in working-class struggle with employers for wage
increases, I chose to analyze two variables pertaining to labor union strength. Following
Carter (2007), I included a variable for union density measured as the percentage of the
labor force unionized in any given year. Since union density does not necessarily capture
union activity, I also included the annual number of work stoppages involving 1,000 or
more workers. In addition, I included a variable for the federal minimum wage rate in
order to capture the effect of federal labor standards on wage growth. All other variables
are intended to control for the effects of supply and demand in the labor market, with the
exception of a dummy variable intended to capture the effects of war on the labor market.
Table 1. Explanation of Variables1
Variable

Description

Sample Mean
(Standard Deviation)

Ln(gdswge)
(Dependent)

Average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory
employees, goods-producing industries, 1982-84 dollars

2.21 (0.04)

Ln(srvwge)
(Dependent)

Average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory
employees, private service-providing industries, 1982-84 dollars

2.09 (0.06)

Wrkstp (+)

Annual work stoppages involving 1,000 or more workers

131.6 (135.07)

Unmprt (-)

Annual average unemployment rate, civilian labor force (16
years and over)

6.05 (1.65)

Ln(prdctvtyg) (+)

Output per hour (2005 = 100), manufacturing sector

3.98 (0.44)

Ln(prdctvtynfrm) (+)

Output per hour (2005 = 100), nonfarm business sector

4.24 (0.26)

Lbrfrcunn (+)

% of labor force unionized (private sector)

16.15 (8.15)

Ln(minwg) (+)

Federal minimum wage rate, 1982-84 dollars

3.37 (0.53)

Gdshrs (+)

Average weekly hours of production/non-supervisory employees,
goods-producing industries

40.17 (0.52)

Srvhrs (+)

Average weekly hours of production/non-supervisory employees,
service-providing industries

33.57 (1.49)

Mnftempl (+)

# of production and non-supervisory employees in goods
producing industries

16817.85 (1261.86)

Gdpgrwth (+)

Annual GDP percent change, 2012 dollars

6.93 (2.97)

War (+)

Dummy variable = 1 if U.S. involved in war

0.52 (0.51)
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The following models were estimated :
Econometric
Models and Estimation Methods

The following models were estimated3:
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔! =

𝑓𝑓(  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤! , 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢!!! , 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝! , 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙! , 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚! , 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟! , 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ!, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤! ) + εt
(1)

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠! =

𝑓𝑓(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤! , 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢!!! , 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝! , 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙! , 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚! , 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚! , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟! ,

                                                                                                                                                          𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ! , 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤! ) + εt
(2)

Natural log transformations were used where appropriate, as indicated in Table 1. In particular, variables pertaining to wages, productivity, and minimum wage were transformed
so as to
facilitate
convenient interpretation.
Natural
log transformations
were used where appropriate, as indicated in Table 1. In
Time-series data were gleaned from various government sources, particularly the
4
particular,
pertainingand
to wages,
minimum
were transformed
so
Bureau ofvariables
Labor Statistics
Bureauproductivity,
of Economicand
Analysis
. Allwage
observations
are annual
measures. The decision to use annual data was partly motivated by a desire to account for a
aslonger
to facilitate
convenient
interpretation.
time period
and partly
by limited availability of data for particular variables. There
are 48 observations in our dataset, corresponding to the years 1964-2011.
Time-series
gleaned from
various
government
particularly
the Bureau
In order todata
test were
for first-order
serial
correlation,
both sources,
models were
estimated
using
Ordinary Least Squares and then a separate regression
was
performed
on
the
residuals
with
of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis4. All observations are annual measures.
the residuals from the time period immediately prior to the current period as the explanatorydecision
variable
ρ as the
coefficient.
associated
test statistics
arefor
reported
Table
The
to and
use annual
data
was partlyThe
motivated
by a desire
to account
a longerintime
2. In both instances a null hypothesis of no serial correlation was rejected, indicating the
need and
to correct
forlimited
this. Given
the relatively
small
samplevariables.
size, the use
of are
a Prais-Winsten
period
partly by
availability
of data for
particular
There
48
estimator was chosen as a remedy for serial correlation in the error terms.
observations
in ourtest
dataset,
years 1964-2011.
A White
was corresponding
conducted on to
thethe
Prais-Winsten
estimated residuals and coefficients from model 1 in order to check for possible heteroskedasticity issues. The associIn order
to test
first-order
serial correlation,
models were
using
ated test
statistics
areforreported
in Table
2. Based onboth
a chi-square
test,estimated
a null hypothesis
of
constant error term variances was rejected, and thus the final estimation procedure was
Ordinary
Least
Squares
andstandard
then a separate
regression
was
the residuals withThis
the
conducted
using
robust
errors as
a remedy
forperformed
possible on
heteroskedasticity.
was also conducted for model 2, given its strong resemblance to model 1.
residuals from the time period immediately prior to the current period as the explanatory variable
and ρ as the coefficient. The associated test statistics are reported in Table 2. In both instances a
null hypothesis of no serial correlation was rejected, indicating the need to correct for this. Given
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Results
Table 2 contains the estimation results for both models. It would appear that for goodsproducing industries, productivity change has been one of the primary indicators of real
wage growth for production/non-supervisory employees, and likewise for those working
in the service industry. However, the wage/productivity elasticity is weaker than expected for the former, while it is especially strong for the latter. This could be due to the
fact that the service sector is relatively labor intensive, thus leading employees to capture
a greater proportion of increased output. Furthermore, increases in average weekly hours
worked appear to have a slight negative impact on average hourly earnings. Though this
is contrary to what was initially expected, it is not necessarily inconsistent with intuition
if one considers the possibility that stagnant or declining real earnings could lead to an
increase in weekly hours worked as employees try to make up for the loss in purchasing
power.
What may appear to be particularly surprising here is the relatively slight impact of
unionization on the earnings of goods-producing employees. Contrary to intuition, the influence of unions is statistically insignificant for those industries, which are typically considered bastions of union strength. However, the reasons for this are likely historical. Given
that our data only cover the last five decades, the majority of the time period in question has
been characterized by a decline in the density and strength of manufacturing labor unions.
Union density declined from a high of 31% in 1964 to a low of 6.9% in 2011. This decline
was relatively slight throughout the 60s and 70s, but became more dramatic around the turn
of the 1980s. Therefore it is actually not very surprising that the overall impact of unions
on wage growth in our models has been negligible. It should be noted, however, that as a
consequence of shifts in the composition of U.S. industry, service-sector employment has
grown throughout the period in question. This could explain why union density maintained
a statistically significant, positive impact on service-sector earnings.
Carter has indicated that the wage share of total output began to decline around
1979, suggesting that “a regime change occurred in international primary distribution, one
associated with a decrease in the wage share … as wage earners in many countries experienced erosion in their command of output produced” (2007, 581). A preliminary analysis
suggests that if the time period is disaggregated into the years prior to 1979 and the years
following 1979, the picture looks very different. Appendices 2 and 3 contain the results of
this analysis. Most of the variables analyzed in this study are statistically significant for the
years leading up to 1979 and statistically insignificant for the years after 1979. Given the
small sample sizes associated with these additional regressions, one should not consider
these results conclusive. However, this does suggest that some of our unexpected findings
could be the result of changing historical and political regimes in the U.S. This would appear to justify a more thorough analysis of these specific periods.
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Table 2: Estimation Results for 1964-2011
Natural log of average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory employees, 1982-84
dollars
Variable

Model (1)

Model (2)

Constant

2.12** (0.44)

-1.492 (0.952)

Wrkstp

0.0000286 (0.0000695)

-0.00004 (0.00006)

Unmprt

0.003 (0.003)

0.005 (0.004)

ln(prdctvtyg)

0.16** (0.064)
0.537** (0.122)

ln(prdctvtynfrm)
Lbrfrcunn

0.002 (0.004)

0.0095** (0.0039)

ln(minwg)

0.023 (0.047)

0.034 (0.042)

Gdshrs

-0.017** (0.008)

Srvhrs

0.028* (0.016)

Mnftempl

8.04e-06 (6.91e-06)

Gdpgrwth

0.002* (0.001)

-0.002* (0.0014)

War

-0.0008 (0.009)

0.0067 (0.0094)

N

47

47

R2

0.9512

0.9633

F-statistic

2.41

2.8

ᵡ

46.7979

0.000

0.000

0.000

2

p-value (ρ)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively

Conclusion
Our analysis has shown that from an empirical standpoint the connection between wage
growth and productivity changes remains significant, if not strong. However, it also suggests that the “organizational or institutional strength of labor” is an important factor to
consider when dealing with questions of wage determination and income distribution
(Shaikh 2003, 139). Therefore, whether stagnant real wages are primarily a function of
declining productivity (Sullivan 1997) or the declining strength of labor is difficult to determine for sure. It would appear, though, that both should be accounted for in future
empirical investigations, lest too much emphasis be placed on one at the expense of consideration of the other.
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It would be interesting to follow up this study with a more detailed analysis of wage
trends in specific historical periods, perhaps utilizing sub-annual time periods as a way of
increasing sample size and estimation accuracy. Furthermore, a similar analysis of trends
in supervisory-employee earnings is certainly warranted. Hopefully these kinds of studies
can shed light on some of the most pressing economic issues of our time, providing insight
into how policy initiatives might curb the growth of income inequality and poverty in the
21st century.

Endnotes
1

Data sources cited in Appendix (1)

3

See Table 1 for description of variables, including summary statistics.

2 The choice of productivity measure was motivated by a desire to match the hourly measurement of wages.
4

See Appendix (1) for precise information on data sourcing.

Appendix 1: Data Sources
Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP percent change from preceding period. Available from http://
www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp. Retrieved November 12, 2012.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2012. Major Work Stoppages (Annual). Available from http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/wkstp.toc.htm. Retrieved November 12, 2012.
_____. Current Employment Statistics. Available from http://www.bls.gov/ces/#tables. Retrieved
November 12, 2012.

_____. Current Population Survey. Available from http://www.bls.gov/cps/prev_yrs.htm. Retrieved
November 12, 2012.

_____. Labor Productivity and Costs. Available from http://www.bls.gov/lpc/. Retrieved November
12, 2012.
_____. Union Membership (Annual). Available from http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.
htm. Retrieved November 12, 2012.
Hirsch, Barry T. 2008. Data appendix to “Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions
and Industrial Competition Coexist?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(1): 153-76.
Available from http://www.unionstats.com/. Retrieved November 12, 2012.

U.S. Department of Labor. Federal Minimum Wage Rates 1955 – 2012. Available from http://www.
infoplease.com/ipa/A0774473.html. Retrieved November 12, 2012.
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Appendix 2: Estimation Results for 1964-1979
Natural log of average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory employees, 1982-84
dollars
Variable

Model (1)

Model (2)

Constant

2.098** (0.615)

-6.39* (2.71)

Wrkstp

0.00023** (0.00003)

0.0003** (0.000057)

Unmprt

-0.0045 (0.0024)

-0.027** (0.005)

ln(prdctvtyg)

0.552** (0.082)
1.739** (0.388)

ln(prdctvtynfrm)
Lbrfrcunn

0.01** (0.0013)

0.017** (0.0016)

ln(minwg)

-0.221** (0.032)

-0.284** (0.066)

Gdshrs

-0.049** (0.0096)
0.0585 (0.032)

Srvhrs

-0.00003** (7.24e-06)

Mnftempl
Gdpgrwth

0.014** (0.0035)

0.01118* (0.0047)

N

15

15

R

0.9999

0.9999

F-statistic

801.41

147.13

2

Appendix 3: Estimation Results for 1980-2011
Natural log of average hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory employees, 1982-84
dollars
Variable

Model (1)

Model (2)

Constant

2.457** (0.423)

-0.332 (0.874)

Wrkstp

6.03e-06 (0.00016)

-0.0001 (0.00016)

Unmprt

0.0033 (0.0022)

0.0019 (0.0049)

ln(prdctvtyg)

0.074 (0.063)
0.434** (0.0928)

ln(prdctvtynfrm)
Lbrfrcunn

0.0025 (0.006)

0.0123** (0.0048)

ln(minwg)

0.036 (0.05)

0.0286 (0.0529)

Gdshrs

-0.016** (0.008)
0.0096 (0.0212)

Srvhrs

1.26e-06 (0.00001)

Mnftempl
Gdpgrwth

0.00097 (0.0011)

-0.0017 (0.0018)

N

32

32

R2

0.9953

0.9960

F-statistic

1.33

18.00
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